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Abstract
The principle of separate legal entity – that is, after the incorporation of a 
company, it is regarded as an artifi cial person or juridical person who has the 
rights and responsibilities similar to a living person - has been widely accepted 
and applied in the world of business, trade and industry. In Malaysia, an Islamic 
banking institution is incorporated under the Companies Act 1965 where after 
its incorporation, it becomes a legal entity separated from its members and 
shareholders. In the case of Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad v. Adnan bin Omar 
(1994), the court held that Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad is a corporate institution 
created by statute. This case has been decided based on civil law system, not 
under the Islamic legal system. Since the products offered by an Islamic banking 
institution is solely in harmony with Islamic principles, one fundamental legal 
question yet to be resolved is whether the principle of separate legal entity is 
recognised under the Syariah law. This paper aims to discuss the issue of separate 
legal entity in Islam and its application to the Islamic banking institutions.
Keywords: separate legal entity, Islamic banking institutions, Syariah, juridical 
person, company
JEL Classifi cation: K29
1  Editors’ Note: This article is not on the operational aspects of banking as all our 
accepted articles have been over the last six years, but on the lacuna in law as to what is an 
Islamic bank. It is important enough to be included in this journal as this article points to 
a fundamental legal problem of recognition of Islamic bank as a legal persona. It appears 
that the term ‘Islamic Bank’ that can be traced to the fi rst Islamic bank founded in 1963 
has had no historical precedent in Islamic laws, and remains yet to be formally recognized 
in Syariah laws some 45 years after this entity has been invented and nurtured over the 
years. 
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1.  Introduction
One of the important elements in the common law concept of separate legal 
entity is that once a company has been incorporated, it will be considered as 
‘a person’. The corporation inter alia has the right to sue and to be sued, own 
property in its name and it is separate from the owner or shareholders of the 
corporation. The liability of the owner or the shareholder is limited to only the 
value of shares invested in that particular company. In Islam, there are views 
concerning this legal matter. The traditional Islamic jurists opinion is that the 
principle of separate legal entity does not exist in Islam. It is for a very simple 
fact that a company which is regarded as ‘a person’ is only a fi ctitious person and 
only an imaginary person, as such, has no capacity to engage in any commercial 
transaction. This is one view. Besides, if a company or the fi ctitious entity 
is declared insolvent, the creditors have only the rights over the assets of the 
company which is only registered under the imaginary person whereby if the 
assets are not suffi cient to settle the amount, it is simply written off and cannot 
be claimed from anyone. 
It is therefore pertinent to determine the existence of the principle of 
separate legal entity in Syariah and its application to Islamic banking institutions 
in Malaysia. In sections 2 and 3, we examine the grounds for this legal entity 
within the English system of laws and its growth in Malaysia. In sections 4 and 5, 
the reader will fi nd a discussion of the historical development of bodies outside 
of a real person with legal recognition given under the Syariah laws. There it is 
clear that there is a clear difference of opinion for and against the recognition of 
a legal person outside that of a real person although there are such bodies – not 
banks – that had been given such recognition in historical time by jurists. We 
discuss the need for clarity by way of some an initiative to arrive at a ruling to 
give recognition of legal persona to the banking institutions in Malaysia.  
2. The Principle of Separate Legal Entity under Common Law
A company is a corporation. A corporation is a succession or collection of persons 
having at law an existence, rights and duties, separate and distinct from those of 
the persons who are from time to time its members (Keenan and Bisacre, 2005, 
p. 2). A corporation carries with it several distinguishing features, namely it is a 
persona at law, i.e. an artifi cial person; and it has perpetual succession, i.e. the 
company carries on and is not dissolved despite the changes in its membership 
since its existence is maintained by the constant succession of new persons who 
replace those who die or being removed.
The doctrine of separate legal entity was originated from the case Salomon 
v. Salomon & Co. Ltd. [1897]. The facts in this case disclosed that a company 
had been incorporated by Mr. Salomon in which he and members of his family 
were the only shareholders. The issue arises when the company’s business turn 
to be a failure. The value of the assets was insuffi cient to pay out both Mr. 
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Salomon and the company’s other creditors. Consequently, the creditors raised 
an issue whereby they argued that Mr. Salomon should not receive the payment 
from the company because the degree of control he exercised over the company.
It was held by the House of Lords that despite Mr. Salomon having the 
control over the company, it was neither his agent nor trustee. This is because, 
a company was treated as operating the business in its own right, and as being 
separate from its controller, i.e. in this case of Mr. Salomon. Therefore, the 
charge given by the company to Mr. Salomon was valid and he was entitled to 
be paid his debt even though other creditors of the company would not be paid 
because the company had insuffi cient assets to pay all its creditors.
Thus, it shows that a company is a legal person separate and distinct from 
its individual members or directors as in the words of Cave J in Re Sheffi eld & 
South Sheffi eld Yorkshire Permanent Building Society, In Liquidation [1889]: ‘a 
company is a legal persona just as much as an individual’.
In Macaura v. Northern Assurance Co. Ltd. [1925], Mr Macaura, had 
formed an estate company. Thereupon, he sold his owned timber estate for
 42,000 to the estate company, whereby the purchase money was paid by the 
company in the form of issuance of 42,000 fully paid shares of   1 each. Macaura 
had effected an insurance policy on the timber in his own name, and not in 
the company’s name. Eventually, on 23 February 1922, most of the timber was 
destroyed by fi re. Thus, Macaura claimed under his insurance policies. However, 
it was ruled by the court that Macaura have no insurable interest. The insurance 
policy effected by him could only be on the basis of a creditor or a shareholder 
of the company, which neither two has an insurable interest in the assets of the 
company based on the principle that a company is an independent entity.
A company also has perpetual succession despite of the death of its 
shareholders. In Lee (Catherine) v. Lee’s Air Farming Ltd. [1960], the facts 
disclosed that in 1954, Mr. Lee had formed the respondent company carrying on 
the business of crop spraying from the air. Mr. Lee owned 2,999 of the company’s 
3,000    1 shares. Apart from that, he also was the company’s governing director 
whereby he had appointed himself as the only pilot of the company at a salary 
arranged by himself. In March 1956, Mr. Lee was killed while piloting an 
aircraft during the course of top-soil dressing. The appellant want to claim 
compensation from the company as the employer of her husband under the New 
Zealand Workers’ Compensation Act 1922. The issue for determination was 
whether there existed the relationship of employer and employee between the 
company and Mr. Lee. The court held in favour of appellant and she was entitled 
to compensation. Following the grounds of the decision in Salomon’s case, Mr. 
Lee was employed by the company in the sense required by the Act 1922.
According to Keenan & Bisacre (2005, p. 27), the principle set out in the 
above case has also led to the use of the term ‘the veil of incorporation, which is 
said to hang between the company and its members and in law at least, act as a 
screen between them.
Under certain circumstances, this doctrine of separate legal entity produces 
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to come out under a moral or intellectual pressure to sidestep the principle of 
separate legal entity and produce a result which seems more ‘just’ (Pettet, 2005, 
p. 24). There are many reported cases that show the attitude of the judges to 
by-pass the precedent of Salomon’s case in order to achieve justice by ‘lifting’ 
or ‘piercing’ the corporate veil (Re A Company (1985) at p. 241; Creasey v. 
Breachwood Motors Ltd. [1992] at p. 647).
Lord Denning MR suggested that the corporate veil could be lifted, that the 
companies were in reality a group, and should be treated as one (DHN Ltd. V. 
Tower Hamlets [1976]). On the other note, the House of Lords criticized Lord 
Denning’s approach and held that the corporate veil could only be lifted in this 
way in circumstances where the company is a ‘façade’ (Woolfson v. Strathclyde 
DC (1978)).
In Adams v. Cape Industries plc [1990], the court gave strong support 
to the idea that there is really only one well-recognised exception to the rule 
prohibiting the piercing of the corporate veil. That is ‘it is appropriate to pierce 
the corporate veil only where special circumstances exist indicating that it is a 
mere façade concealing the true facts. In Trustor AB v. Smallbone & Ors. (No. 3) 
[2002], Morritt V-C held that the court would be ‘entitled to pierce the corporate 
veil and recognize the receipt by a company as that of the individual in control of 
it if the company was used as a device or façade to conceal the true facts thereby 
avoiding or concealing any liability of those individual’, and that on the facts 
this was satisfi ed.
3. Separate Legal Entity under Malaysian Law
This doctrine established in English law has received its application in Malaysia 
via the Companies Act 1965 (Act 125). Section 16(5) laid down the effect of its 
incorporation, namely:
• A company shall be regarded as a body corporate, capable of exercising 
all the functions of an incorporated company.
The term ‘body corporate’ is not defi ned under the Companies Act 1965. 
However, generally it covers both the ‘companies’ and ‘corporation’. Both of 
these terms are defi ned under Section 4 of Companies Act 1965 which will be 
discussed later on. ‘Corporation’ is one of an artifi cial legal person (Zuhairah 
Ariff, 2003). According to Salleh Abas FJ, it is ‘artifi cial’ the company’s legal 
persona is the result of statutory acts of the Registrar of Companies under s. 16 
of Companies Act 1965 (Tan Lai v. Mohamed Bin Mahmud [1982]). In addition 
to that, Zakaria Yatim, J in People’s Insurance Co (M) Sdn Bhd v. People’s 
Insurance Co Ltd & Ors [1986] held that under the ordinary rules of law, a 
parent company and its subsidiary company, even a wholly owned subsidiary 
company, are distinct legal entities.
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In one of the Court of Appeal’s decision, it was held inter alia that even 
though an individual is the director of two companies, both companies possesses 
two different entities (Nanyang Union Sdn. Bhd. v. Gloveline Industries (M) 
Sdn. Bhd. [2006]). The fact in the present case disclosed that Mr. Radwan Alami 
was the director of two companies; namely Gloveline Industries (M) Sdn. Bhd. 
and Safeline Industries (M) Sdn. Bhd. Nevertheless, both these companies are 
not the same as each company has their own separate entity. 
• A company will have the right of suing and being sued.
In Lee Eng Eow (as director of Lee Guat Cheow & Co Sdn Bhd) v Mary Lee 
(as executrix of the estate of Low Ai Lian) & Ors [1999], the Court of Appeal 
had laid down the statutory effects of an incorporation, in that an incorporated 
association has a legal personality of its own apart from the persons who comprise 
it; even though it is not specifi cally provided in the Companies Act 1965. If a 
director breaches his duty to the company, it is the company who has the right to 
sue him. A member cannot sue the director on the company’s behalf. Similarly, 
if a contracting party breaches his contract with the company, it is the company 
who has the right to sue the contractor. A member of the company cannot sue on 
the company’s behalf to enforce a company’s rights. This rule is known as the 
‘proper plaintiff rule’ or the rule in Foss v. Harbottle (1843).
• A company will have perpetual succession.
To illustrate on this point, in the case of Abdul Aziz Bin Atan v. Ladang Rengo 
Malay Estate Sdn. Bhd. [1985], despite changes in the membership, the corporate 
entity continues unchanged. In Re Noel Tedman Holdings Pty Ltd [1967], the 
company may even continue to exist despite the death of all its shareholders and 
directors.
• A company will have the power to hold land and other property.
Article 9 of the Third Schedule to the Companies Act 1965 provides that a 
company possesses the power to purchase, take on lease or in exchange, hire 
and otherwise acquire any movable or immovable property. Besides, such 
rights are also conferred onto states by the National Land Code, where section 
43(b) conferred on the State Authority with the power to dispose the land to the 
corporations.
Even though section 16(5) of Companies Act 1956 only mentions the right 
to own land, a company also possesses the right to own other sort of property 
(Tan Cheng Han, 2005). The property will be treated as the company’s own 
and not the shareholder. Therefore, even if a person owns all the shares in the 
company, he does not own the company’s property nor does he have any legal 
or equitable interest therein (Macaura v. Northern Assurance Co. Ltd. [1925]).
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• The liability on the part of the members to contribute to the assets of 
the company in the event of its being wound up are provided by the 
Companies Act 1965. 
For example, according to s. 214(1)(d) of Companies Act 1965, in the case of a 
company limited by shares, the liability of its members is limited to the amount 
unpaid on his or her shares in the company. This was noted as one of the benefi t 
enjoyed by the members of the limited company (Rachagan et al., 2005).
In other words, section 16(5) of Companies Act 1965 adopted the principle 
of separate legal entity as embodied in Salomon’s case; i.e. the creation of a 
person in the eyes of the law upon incorporation of a company.
Similarly, under Common Law system, the Malaysian cases also accepts 
the principle of lifting the corporate veil. Peh Swee Chin, SCJ in Yap Sing Hock 
& Anor v. Public Prosecutor [1992] said that: “Such veil has been lifted by 
statutes, e.g. the Companies Act 1965 itself or by the courts for certain specifi c 
purposes. The lifting of the veil clearly constitutes a violation of the primary 
principle but this has come to be treated correctly as an exception to the primary 
principle with such exception being subject to the parameters and perimeters 
indicated by the statutes or by the specifi c purposes so far indicated by the courts 
when lifting the veil”. 
To highlight on this point, we could refer to the case of Aspatra Sdn Bhd & 
21 Ors v. Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd & Anor [1988] where the majority of 
Supreme Court held that the lifting of the corporate veil in a group of companies 
in order to do justice, particularly when there is an element of fraud involved, 
was proper to expose the true owner of the company’s assets (i.e. Lorrain Osman) 
in granting a Mareva injunction. In this case, the respondents had brought an 
action against Lorrain Osman, who was a director of the fi rst respondent and the 
chairman of the second respondent, for the total sum of $27,625,853.06 which 
they claimed to be secret profi ts made by Lorrain without their knowledge and 
approval. The respondents also made an ex parte application for a Mareva 
injunction to restrain Lorrain from transferring his assets out of jurisdiction 
and also for an order of discovery for Lorrain to disclose the value, nature and 
whereabouts of all his assets.
The fact disclosed that only 32 out of 21,796,395 shares in the appellant 
companies did not belong to Lorrain. He also exercised the effective or sole 
control of the companies by holding more than 99 percent of the total paid up 
capital of the 22 appellant companies. In addition, Lorrain also was a director 
in 15 of them. Based on this, the learned judge lifted the corporate veil to see 
whether the companies and their shareholders were in fact the same entity. The 
secret profi ts received by Lorrain were not denied on affi davit evidence; only the 
legal capacity under which Lorrain had received them was being contested. No 
doubt that it was admittedly an element of fraud in the receipt of the secret profi ts 
whatever might be the capacity in which Lorrain had received them. Thus, it is 
suffi cient for the court to lift the corporate veil for the purpose of determining 
whether the assets of the companies are really owned by them as envisaged in 
Salomon’s case [1897] and section 16(5) of the Companies Act 1965.
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Although the learned judge did not say so expressly in his judgment, 
he in fact found the existence of such an abuse from the very structure of the 
companies after lifting the corporate veil. The learned judge found that Lorrain 
was the alter ego of the companies, and the assets of the appellant companies are 
in fact and in law Lorrain’s assets.
Therefore, we may conclude that there are two types of person recognized 
by the law. The fi rst one being the natural person or human beings; and the second 
would be the artifi cial person (Tan Lai v. Mohamed Bin Mahmud [1982]), which 
includes any being other than human being which the law recognized as having 
duties and rights. One of the most recognized artifi cial person is the corporation. 
Thus, we can see that the doctrine of separate legal entity is a fundamental legal 
principle which draws a distinction between an incorporated company and those 
people who have a control over it. A company will continue unchanged even if 
the identity of the participants in it changes (Aiman Nariman et al., 2002).
4. The Principle of Separate Legal Entity and Syariah Law
The principle of separate legal entity as introduced under the common law 
system fi nds no express provisions from any Syariah law resources. Zuhairah 
Ariff (2003) noted that some of the modern jurists of fi qh like Mustafa Ahmad 
al-Zarqa, Muhammad Abu Zuhrah and etc. justify the existence of entity other 
than human being as a legal person based on the theory of fi qh known as al-
dhimmah. ‘Al-dhimmah’ basically means ‘guarantee’ or ‘accountable’ (Nasri 
Naiimi, 2007).
According to Al-Kabashi (1989), some jurists view that the term al-
dhimmah and al-ahliyyah (capacity) as synonymous, both of which represent 
the entity that have rights, bear responsibilities and obligation. Thus, if an entity 
(al-dhimmah) is recognized to be in existence, either artifi cial or real, it will 
have a certain capacity (al-ahliyyah) and therefore will be subjected to certain 
obligations (iltizamat). 
Nevertheless, this opinion was heavily criticised by the majority of the 
jurists because al-dhimmah refers to anything which has attributes of human 
being that denotes to it rights and responsibilities (al-Izibn, 660H, al-Bahuti 
1041H, Ibn ‘Abidin, 1252H.). Besides, al-Bazdawi (483H) and al-Nawawi, 
(676H) opined that al-dhimmah is a ‘zat’ which is real and not fi ctitious, since 
the Syariah only imposed obligations and rights on real person. Moreover, the 
term al-dhimmah is not applicable at all and it has no relevancy in relation to 
interpretation of liability and obligation (al-Tahanawi, 1996).
However, the modern jurists like Taqi Usmani propagate the existence of 
the principle of separate legal entity under Syariah law based on precedents of 
other Islamic institutions and practice like waqf, masjid (mosque), baitul mal, 
joint stock, inheritance under debt and Al Abd al-Ma’thoon (the slave who 
is permitted by his master to trade). Briefl y, his argument as the basis for the 
existence of separate legal entity will be discussed.
According to Taqi Usmani, waqf is a legal and religious institution wherein 
a person dedicates some of his properties for a religious or a charitable purpose, 
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creating separate legal entity. The properties, after being declared as waqf, no 
longer remain in the ownership of the donor. The benefi ciaries of a waqf can 
benefi t from the corpus or the proceeds of the dedicated property, but they are 
not its owners (Taqi Usmani, 2006 at p. 105). Muslim jurists (fuqaha’) have 
treated waqf institution as separate legal entity based on two rulings; fi rst, if a 
property is bought by using the waqf’s money, the property does not become part 
of waqf, but become the property owned by the waqf  institution. In other words, 
it demonstrates that the waqf institution may own a property. Another example 
given by him is that any donation given to the masjid, the donation belongs to 
the masjid and not become part of waqf. Furthermore, according to Ahmad al-
Dardir, a distinguished Maliki jurist, a bequest made in favour of a mosque is 
accepted in Islam.
Another precedent that formed the basis for Taqi Usmani’s (2006, pp. 105-
106) argument for the existence of separate legal entity in Syariah law is the 
baitul mal. According to him, Imam Al-Sarakhsi, the well-known Hanafi  jurist, 
in his work “Al-Mabsut” stated that baitul mal has some rights and obligations 
which may possibly be undetermined. Al-Sarakhsi also pointed out that “If the 
head of an Islamic state needs money to give salaries to his army, but he fi nds 
no money in the Kharaj department of the Baitul-mal (wherefrom the salaries 
are generally given) he can give salaries from the sadaqah (Zakat) department, 
but the amount so taken from the sadaqah department shall be deemed to be a 
debt on the Kharaj department”. Based on the views of al-Sarakhsi (1986) in al-
Mabsut, it clearly shows that a department may borrow and indebted to another 
department.
Furthermore, the principle in a joint stock company which is found in the 
Fiqh of Imam Shafi ‘i, also formed the basis of Taqi Usmani’s argument on the 
separate legal entity in Islam. It is a settled principle of Shafi ‘i School that if more 
than one person run their business in partnership, where their assets are mixed 
with each other, the zakat will be levied on each of them individually. However, 
the zakat will be payable on their joint-stock as a whole, so much so that even if 
one of them does not own the amount of the nisab, but the combined value of the 
total assets exceeds the prescribed limit of the nisab, zakat will be payable on the 
whole joint-stock including the share of the former, and thus the person whose 
share is less than the nisab shall also contribute to the levy in proportion to his 
ownership in the total assets. He was not subject to the levy of zakat, had it been 
levied on each person in his individual capacity. The same principle, which is 
called the principle of ‘Khultah-al-Shuyu‘’ is more forcefully applied to the levy 
of zakat on the livestock. Consequently, a person sometimes has to pay more 
zakat than he was liable to in his individual capacity, and sometimes he has to 
pay less than that. This principle of ‘Khultah-al-Shuyu‘’ which is also accepted 
to some extent by the Maliki and Hanbali schools with some variance in details, 
has a basic concept of a juridical person underlying it. It is not the individual, 
according to this principle, who is liable to zakat. Again, it is the ‘joint-stock’ 
which has been made subject to the levy. It means that the ‘joint-stock’ has been 
treated a separate entity which is very close to the concept of a ‘juridical person’ 
(Taqi Usmani, 2006, pp. 106-107).
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Lastly, when a deceased leaves liabilities exceeding his property, this 
property is neither owned by the deceased, nor is it owned by his heirs, for the 
debts on the deceased have a preferential right over the property as compared to 
the rights of the heirs. It is not even owned by the creditors, because the settlement 
has not yet taken place. They have their claims over it, but it is not their property 
unless it is actually divided between them. Being property of nobody, it has its 
own existence and it can be termed a legal entity. The heirs of the deceased or 
his nominated executor will look after the property as managers, but they are not 
the owners. If the process of the settlement of debt requires some expenses, the 
same will be met by the property itself (Taqi Usmani, 2006, p. 107).
The basis of the opinion for the existence of the principle of separate entity 
by Taqi Usmani however is heavily criticised in a book entitled “The Concept 
of Limited Liability – Untenable in Shariah” by Mujlisul Ulama of South Africa 
(http://books.themajlis.net/node/251). On waqf, it is refuted and argued that the 
assets purchased with the income of a waqf do not become part of the original 
waqf property for the simple reason that for anything to become waqf there has to 
be a ‘waaqif’ (a human being who dedicates the asset in the Path of Allah (God) 
as waqf). The waaqif of the waqf property specifi cally and expressly made the 
property waqf so that it could be employed to generate income for distribution to 
whatever charitable cause he/she (the waaqif) had designated. If the income of 
the waqf too has to become waqf automatically, the very aim and purpose of the 
waqf will be defeated and it will be devoid of utility. This is a dissenting view.
As for masjid, it is concurred that the ownership vests in Allah s.w.t. and 
Allah is not fi ctitious. Ownership of the masjid in this context means ownership 
of the Owner of the masjid. Allah s.w.t. who is the true owner of the masjid 
becomes likewise the owner of all assets made waqf for the expenditure of the 
masjid, and of all income generated by these waqf assets. As such, it negates 
the idea of the waqf being a fi ctitious entity like the common law principle of 
separate legal entity when the Syariah law emphasises the real ownership of the 
waqf to Allah s.w.t.? Is it not against the Syariah principles to negate Allah’s 
ownership for relegating waqf to the limbo of fi ction merely for substantiating 
the concept of separate legal entity or ‘juridical person’?
The argument applying baitul mal as the basis for the recognition of 
separate legal entity is also been criticised by Mujlisul Ulama of South Africa. 
The different classes of wealth such as zakat and kharaj have to be expended in 
different avenues or for different purposes. If, for example, zakat money is used to 
construct a masjid, the obligation of zakat will not be discharged. If zakat money 
is thus spent in a category of expenditure which does not result in the discharge 
of the zakat obligation, it (zakat) will have to be made good by person who had 
used the funds for another purpose. This is not exclusive with the baitul mal. 
This law applies to everyone. The Khalifah is empowered by the Syariah law to 
take money from one category of funds and utilize it for a different purpose other 
than for what the money has to be used for according to the Syariah law. But 
in relation to the Khalifah such use is not misappropriation because the Shariah 
law permits this. However, when later funds of the particular kind are received, 
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the Khalifah has to replace it to ensure that correct distribution is achieved. It 
is simply an issue of replacing the funds which the Khalifah had borrowed by 
virtue of the right the Syariah law has given him. The inanimate vaults in which 
are kept the funds do not lend. The Khalifah does not represent the baitul mal. 
He does not contract on behalf of the baitul mal which has no such capacity. He 
represents Allah s.w.t. and acts in terms of the mandate assigned to him by Allah 
s.w.t. The Khalifah is not in need of a concept such as ‘separate legal entity’ to 
carry out his mandate.
The obligation of zakat only applies to Muslims. Zakat will not be 
obligatory, according to the Shafi ’e Mazhab on the joint stock owned by a Muslim 
and a non-muslim. If the stock of a non-Muslim and the stock of a Muslim are 
combined, khultah has taken place. If the obligation of zakat devolves on the 
joint inanimate rice and barley which were mixed or on any other combined 
stock, it would logically follow that zakat will have to be paid regardless of one 
partner being a Muslim and one a non-Muslim. Only the Muslim will pay zakat 
on his share of the mixture. The non-Muslim will not pay zakat on his share of 
the admixture regardless of the incidence of khultah. If the joint stock was truly 
a separate entity or a juridical person in the Western conception of the term, 
then zakat should have been obligatory on the stock by virtue of the principle of 
khultah regardless of the faiths of the owners of the joint stock. Faith does not 
apply to the inanimate ‘juridical person’ (theMajlis.net). Imran (2003, p. 117) 
expressly stated that artifi cial person or juridical person cannot perform religious 
duties including zakat. It is therefore meaningless to portray the joint stock as 
a juridical person and divert the obligation of zakat from the joint stock to only 
the Muslim.
Imran (2003) further opposed the existence of separate legal entity 
in Syariah law, though termed it as fi ctitious person or artifi cial person. The 
concept of separate legal entity that a company is a fi ctitous person relied on 
the instances of waqf, baitul mal and the estate of deceased has been regarded 
as misplaced assertions by modern Muslim jurists. According to him, the 
concept of syarikah will lose its signifi cance if the separate legal entity concept 
acknowledged in Syariah law. In consequence, the acceptance of the principle 
will shatter the whole structure and violates the fundamental principles of 
Syariah law particularly law of contract. Hence, there is a strong opposition to 
the concept of legal persona for a corporation.
5. Islamic Banking Institution in Malaysia
The establishment of Islamic banking institutions refl ects the desire of Muslims 
to live fi nancial aspects of their lives in accordance with the teaching of Islam, 
as interpreted by a majority of scholars. Practically, the emergence of Islamic 
banking in Malaysia can be traced back to 1960s. Nevertheless, much of their 
principles are derived from the Qur’an and the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad 
p.b.u.h. more than 1400 years ago, so it is claimed by the majority opinion now 
prevalent on this institutional practices.
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Islamic Banking Act 1983 (Act 276) (hereinafter referred to as IBA) served 
as the legal basis for the establishment of the Islamic Banks in Malaysia. It is one 
of the few Islamic legislations passed by the Parliament to deal with the banking 
system. IBA came into effect on 7 April 1983. IBA had underlined on numerous 
occasions the control and supervision of the Central Bank of Malaysia (“Central 
Bank”) over Islamic banks. 
Apart from that, the Government also played a part to ensure the smooth 
running of the Islamic banks. Pursuant to this, the Government Investment 
Act 1983 was enacted at the same time of IBA to empower the Government to 
issue Government Investment Issue, which is a government security similar to a 
Treasury instrument  issued based on Syariah principles.
Section 2 of IBA 1983 defi nes ‘Islamic bank’ as any company which carries 
on Islamic banking business and holds a valid licence; and all the offi ces and 
branches in Malaysia of such a bank shall be deemed to be one bank. Further, 
IBA defi nes ‘Islamic banking business’ as to mean banking business whose aims 
and operations do not involve any element which is not approved by the religion 
of Islam. Thus, the establishment of an Islamic banking institution is very much 
focused on the transactions that are Syariah’s compliance.
Apart from that, IBA also stressed on the requirement of licensed Islamic 
bank. This has been highlighted under section 3 of IBA where it states that 
an Islamic banking business shall not be transacted in Malaysia except by a 
company which is in the possession of a licence in writing from the Minister 
authorizing it to do so. Therefore, if a company desires an authority to carry 
on Islamic banking business, it shall apply for such licence through the Central 
Bank to the Minister. Here, the Central Bank’s role is to consider the application 
and to make recommendation to the Minister stating whether a licence should 
be granted or not and the conditions, if any, to be attached to the licence. Then, 
the Minister shall decide whether to grant a licence with or without conditions, 
or refuse a licence.
As discussed above, particularly in reference to IBA, the word ‘company’ 
has been used in numerous occasions to describe Islamic bank, for example 
under section 2 and 3 of IBA. Section 2 of IBA 1983 defi nes ‘Islamic bank’ 
as any company which carries on Islamic banking business and holds a valid 
licence; and all the offi ces and branches in Malaysia of such a bank shall be 
deemed to be one bank. This shows that an Islamic bank in Malaysia must be 
a company (Halsbury’s Laws of Malaysia, Vol. 14, 2002 at p. 255). However, 
IBA did not defi ne the term ‘company’ or ‘corporation’ itself (section 2, IBA 
1983).
Nevertheless, the section 4 of the Companies Act 1965 defi ne the term 
‘company’ as to mean a company incorporated pursuant to the Companies 
Act 1965 or pursuant to any corresponding previous enactment. The same 
section also defi nes the term ‘corporation’ means any body corporate formed 
or incorporated or existing within Malaysia or outside Malaysia and includes 
any foreign company, but excluding four specifi c categories of corporation as 
enumerated in that section. Apart from that, section 2 of the Companies Act 
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1965 also defi nes ‘banking corporation’ to mean a licensed bank, a licensed 
merchant bank and an Islamic bank.
All of this indicates that a banking institution, particularly Islamic bank, is a 
company incorporated under s. 16(5) of Companies Act 1965, and consequently 
the rule of separate legal entity which embodied in a company is also applicable 
to the Islamic banking institution. In addition to that, section 55 of the Companies 
Act 1965 states that since Islamic bank is incorporated under the Companies Act 
1965, than it shall be subjected to both of the provisions under Companies Act 
1965 and IBA 1983. But, in case of confl ict or inconsistency between the two 
Acts, the provisions of IBA shall prevail. 
This has been explained by Norhashimah Mohd Yassin (1997) while 
commenting on the case of Bank Islam Malaysia Bhd. v Adnan Bin Omar 
(unreported), where it deals with the issue of jurisdiction of Syariah Court 
over Islamic banking cases. The court in that case had decided that BIMB is 
a corporate body which has no religion, and consequently it is not within the 
jurisdiction of Syariah Courts. List II (State List) of the Ninth Schedule to the 
Federal Constitution stated that the Syariah Courts shall have jurisdiction only 
over persons professing the religion of Islam and in respect only of any matters 
included in the State List. NH Chan J held that the matter was rightly brought 
before the civil court because Islamic Institutions such as BIMB and Syarikat 
Takaful are corporate institutions created by statute and do not have a religion 
(Norhashimah Mohd Yassin, 1997 at p. cxcv-cxcvi).
Another interesting case which attracted the application of doctrine of 
separate legal entity in Islamic banking is the case of Dato’ Hj Nik Mahmud 
bin Daud v. Bank Islam Malaysia Bhd. [1996]. The fact disclosed that a Bay’ 
Bithaman Ajil fi nancing agreement was entered into by plaintiff and BIMB to 
develop his piece of land in Kelantan. The land is held under the Kelantan Malay 
Reservation Enactment 1930; whereby section 7(i) prohibits any transfer or 
transmission or vesting of any right or interest of a Malay in reservation land to 
or in any person not being a Malay. The issue here is whether there is a transfer 
or a vesting of right or interest involving a non-Malay. This is due to the fact 
that BIMB is a bank with neither a Malay nor a native of Kelantan. However, to 
reconcile this matter and to enable the bank to register the charge, Schedule D 
of the 1930 Enactment allows Rulers in Council to grant Malay status to a bank 
for the purpose of registering a charge document (Norhashimah Mohd Yassin, 
1997 at p. cc-cci).   
6. Suggestion and Conclusion
Looking at the discussion above, it is clear that the issue on the existence of the 
principle of separate legal entity in Syariah law draws differences of opinions 
among the jurists. However, to draw back from the principle will defi nitely 
causing a huge impact on the Islamic banking system and institutions which 
already are so advanced and well accepted throughout the world. Even the 
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dissenting jurists on the acceptance of separate legal entity in Syariah law (based 
on dhimmah, baitul mal, waqf etc) acknowledged the importance of justifying 
and accommodating the legal validity of a fi ctitious legal personality or separate 
legal entity under Syariah law whenever it is clashed (Imran, 2003, p. 17).
Hence, to reconcile the matter, it is indeed an urgent need to have a specifi c 
fatwa or Islamic injunction by the Muslim jurists on this matter, what more if it 
can be a collective fatwa of them to become an ijma’ (considered consensus). As 
advocated by Taqi Usmani (2002), this ijtihad should preferably be undertaken 
by the Syariah jurists at a collective level, yet, as a pre-requisite, there should be 
some individual efforts which may serve as a basis for the collective exercise. 
Thus, it is worthy to note an opinion by Wahbah al-Zuhayli on “syarikah ‘inan” 
because the concept of syarikah ‘inan has become the basis for the establishment 
of Islamic banking institution throughout the world. 
On the concept syarikah ‘inan, there are several categories of companies 
which are akin to company under common law, namely, syarikah al-tawsiyyah al-
basitah (company limited by guarantee), syarikah al-musahamah, al-tawsiyyah 
bil-asham and zatul mas’uliyyah al-mahdudah (company limited by share). The 
various names of the syarikah/company limited by share are due to fl exibility 
and compatibility of Islam based on the principle of ‘urf (custom) to suit the 
changing nature of modern world of trade and business. The shareholders of 
these companies have limited liabilities according to the portion of shares held 
(Wahbah Zuhayli, 1995 at p 882-887) just as in English laws. However, Wahbah 
Zuhayli does not specifi cally state the principle of neither separate legal entity 
nor juristic person (syakhsiyah maknawiyah) on the nature of these companies, 
but it is inferential from the nature of the companies, there are similar to the 
principle of separate legal entity under common law. This is due to the fact that 
the basis for sharikah ‘inan as propounded by Wahbah Zuhayli (2003, pp. 451-
452) is in fact a form of limited partnership. 
According to Wahbah Zuhaily while referring to Ibn al-Mundhir that ‘inan’ 
is a form of partnership, where the partners share the capital, as well as profi ts 
and losses, is approved by consensus. These partners in a sharikah ‘inan need 
not be equal in their contributions to capital, nor equal in their legal rights for 
using the property. Thus, one party may contribute more than another to the 
partnership, and one of the partners may have the exclusive right to run the 
affairs of the partnership. Given this potential for great variation in legal rights 
of dealing in the joint property, each party is only responsible for dealings that 
he himself performed. Thus, while they share the profi ts according to any rule 
they agreed upon in the contract, the only share losses in proportion to their 
contributions to the partnership’s capital. The general rule is summarized thus: 
“profi ts are shared according to the parties’ conditions, but losses are shared 
according to their shares in the capital” (2003, p. 452).
Henceforth, as an example, the establishment of Bank Islam Malaysia 
Berhad is founded on the principle of syarikah ‘inan. According to Dato’ 
Tajuddin Abdul Rahman, Managing Director of Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad, 
the Islamic bank is essentially an ‘inan company, a separate legal entity based 
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on the concept of AI-Musyarakah. The ‘inan company is made up of a minimum 
two shareholders with no limit to the maximum number. It is a business entity, 
formed by having a group of shareholders, electing representatives to manage 
the company (board of directors) on the basis of Wakalah. At the same time the 
shareholders retain their management control (voting rights) in the company in 
proportion to their shareholding.
Even though Taqi Usmani is the champion of separate legal entity, he 
himself has some reservation on its application. The concern is that the company, 
while the liability of the shareholders are limited, being exploited as a vehicle of 
fraud. This is also the basis for the adversaries that the principle is incompatible 
with Syariah law. On the other hand, on the apprehension of the company being 
utilised for avoidance of law or fraudulent purposes, though understandable, may 
be dealt with the application of exception to principle of separate legal entity 
that is, lifting the corporate veil. Though the exception only exposes the ‘real’ 
person behind a company, the liability is still limited to the portion of his shares 
without extending to his personal properties. In other words, the exception to the 
principle of separate legal entity does not fully solve the problem of companies 
being used for fraudulent purposes.
To sum up, the Islamic banking institutions in Malaysia incorporated under 
section 16(5) of Companies Act 1965 is a separate legal entity, enjoying and 
having the rights and liabilities alike to the living person. The application of 
separate legal entity principle upon Islamic banking institutions in Malaysia is 
founded on the common law principle as propounded in the case of Salomon v 
Salomon Co. Ltd. and is applied in toto. The questions of whether the principle 
is recognisable under Syariah law, whether in an unchanged or modifi ed 
application of the principle should be practiced, are pertinent to be answered 
and analysed collectively by Muslim jurists (fuqaha’) for further advancement 
of Islamic banking system.
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